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In the search for causes of the sharp increases in the price of new 
homes, one of t he important but neglected factors surely is the rising 
array of governm~nt regul ations facing land developers, homebuilders , 
financial instit t..t ions, and all others involved i n the housing industry. 
To clear the air at 1:he outset, this is not going to be an uncritical 
attack on all efforts of gove rnment to regulate the private sector. 
Rather, this wil l be an evaluation of the impacts of regulation on indus-
try in general and on housing specifically . The evaluation will end with 
some suggestions for improving the status quo in business-government 
relations. 
Lest I be mi sunderstood, let me state the obvious: government regu-
lation often has yielded important benefits -- in terms of less pollution, 
fewer product ha zards, reduced job discrimination, and other socially 
desirable object ives . Tt should also be realized that these government 
programs were established in response to rising public expectations about 
business performance . Bu t the worthiness of these social objectives should 
not make the speci f i c met hods being used in attempting to achieve them 
totally immune from criticism. It is sad to see the almost instinctive 
negative and hostile reaction, especially on the part of some of the so-
called Public In: erest Groups, to anyone who even questions any of the 
specific means which are used for social regulation. I find it unfortunate 
to have to remind these enthusiasts that only in a totalitarian society 
does the end justify the means. 
') 
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At first blush, government imposition of socially desirable require-
ments on business through the regulatory process appears to be an 
inexpensive way of achieving national objectives. This practice 
apparently costs the government little and represents no significant 
direct burden on the taxpayer. But the public does not escape paying 
the cos t. Every tirne, for example, that the Environmental Protection 
Agency imposes a more costly (and perhaps less polluting) method of 
construct ion on any firm, the cost of the firm's product to the consumer 
will rise. Similar effects flow from the other regulatory efforts, 
including those involving pr·oduct safety, job health, and equal employment 
(and credit) opportunity. 
These higher prices, we need to come to recognize, represent the 
"hidden tax'' of regulation which is shifted from the government to the 
consumer. It is not inevitable that every regulatory activity increase 
inflationary pressures. In those instances where regulation generates 
social benefits (such as a healthier and thus more productive work force) 
in excess of the social costs it imposes, inflationary pressures should 
be reduced. But if the costs are ignored and the focus of public policy 
is only on the benefits, it is almost inevitable that the regulation 
will be pushed beyond the point where the benefits equal the costs and 
to the zone of overregulation. Overregulation, to an economist, is not 
an emotional term, but merely the shorthand for situations where the costs 
imposed by regulation exceed the benefits from the regulation. 
The basic point of this presentation is that the regulatory process 
should be revised so as to derive, at lower costs, much of the same 
benefits as are now achieved. But before we turn to the subject of change, 
let us first examine more closely the various economic effects of regulation. 
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The Range of Housing Regulation 
Government regulation can increase the costs of new homes in many 
ways, driving up land and land development costs, increasing the number 
of expensive building code features to be incorporated, raising overhead 
expenses of real estate and financial institutions, and increasing 
financing costs due to project delays. 
In recent years, there has been a rapid expansion of regulation 
affecting housing at all levels of government. Newer federal regulations 
of special significance cover a wide range. They include standards for 
water quality, pollution discharge, and dredge and fill operations; 
sanctions against localities that do not restrict developments in flood-
prone areas; requirements for state and local governments to regulate 
activities which pollute the air; and regulations affecting closing and 
settlement procedures and the extension of mortgage credit. 
Several states have extended their regulations affecting housing 
development. New types of rules include those governing building in 
'
1critical'' areas such as wetlands, floodplains, and shorelands. States 
have also enacted measures to control erosion and stormwater runoff, to 
control water and air pollution, and to require environmental impact 
statements. 
At the local level, the major change has been toward a fuller and 
more systematic use of traditional land use control techniques. These 
are often supplemented with such new departures as development timing and 
rate controls, higher contributions of land or facilities from developers 
to the local government, and special standards for marshes and floodplains. 
Moreover 11 growth management 11 has become fashionable in many expanding areas. 
Such limitations on the supply of developable land, no matter what the i r 
motivation, force up the price of land and of homes generally. 
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The Costs of Housing Regulation 
There have been several important efforts to quantify the growing 
costs that result from the rising array of regulation of homebuilding 
and housing activities. A study in Colorado found that changing regulatory 
requirements and practices had added $1,500 - $2,000 to the cost of the 
typical new house built between 1970 and 1975. The added cost consisted 
of higher water and sewer tap fees, increased permit fees, greater school 
and park land dedication requirements, and new mandates for wider and 
thicker streets, fences, underground storm sewers, and environmental 
impact studies. 
A study in St. Louis County, Missouri, of the increase in lot develop-
ment and homebuilding costs during 1970-75 found that the expense of 
rneeti ng rr.~1 government requirements came to $1 ,600 - $2,500 for a typi ca 1 
1600 square foot house on a 10,000 square foot lot. THe new governmentally-
imposed requirements included street lighting, greater collector street 
widths, hisher permit and inspection fees, added features to electrical 
systems, and smoke detectors . 
.A. stl1dy covering 21 residential development projects in the New Jersey 
Coastal Zone estimated the direct regulatory expenses for a single family 
house at ~;1 ,600 during the period 1972-75. The costs covered some 38 
separately required permits, including preliminary plat, performance 
improvement bond, sewer plan, tree removal permit, final plans review, 
road drainage permit, and coastal area facilities permit. 
Several studies have examined the adverse impacts of overly stringent 
or outdated building codes. A study at Rutgers University developed 
estimates of such costs as somewhere between 5 and 10 percent of total 
unit costs. Yale University economists have done some interesting work 
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on identifying the extent to which building codes serve as barriers to 
innovation. They point out that the "bewildering variation" in local 
regulations may bar potentially profitable innovations in some areas. 
This reduces the size of the market for technical change in the home-
building industry, with a negative effect on the incentive of building 
materials suppliers to perform research and development in this field. 
The federal government is beginning to get into the building standards 
area. The initial results are not promising. The new ruling on archi-
tectural glazing materials issued by the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
is estimated to cost an additional $30 - $50 per house. The average 
benefits are expected to be a small fraction of that amount. 
More fragmentary, although intriguing, estimates are available of 
the indirect costs of regulation to the home buyer. Giving borrowers the 
booklet required by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act costs about 
35 cents. Completing the forms required by Truth-in-Lending legislation 
may cost no more than "a few dollars." But the regulatory delays in 
carrying out a construction project may be far more costly. The National 
Association of Home Builders states that financing and carrying charges 
for homebuilding come to $10 - $18 a day per lot. Thus, using the $10 
figure, six months' delay comes to $1,825 of additional costs for each 
new home. 
I find particularly fascinating a recent newspaper article quoting 
the Undersecretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
The federal official recalled a conversation that he had with a county 
commissioner when he was a builder in Florida. The county commissioner 
was explaining his 11 pinbal1" technique for protecting the environment: 
··~Jhen a builder comes in with a certain project, I just bounce him 
a round from one department to another. il 
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The rising paperwork and ancillary requirements of government agencies 
inevitably produce a lengthening 11 regulatory lag, 11 a delay that often runs 
into years and is a costly drain on the time and budgets of private 
managers as well as public officials. Ten years ago, the director of 
planning of the Irvine Company obtained in 90 days what was then called 
zoning for a typical residential development. A decade later, the 
company received what is now called an entitlement to build for one of 
its developments, but only following two years of intensive work by a 
specialized group within the company's planning department, aided by the 
public affairs staff. 
The Need for Change 
What can be done to improve the situation? Before we tackle that 
question, we all need to remind ourselves that important and positive 
benefits have resulted from many of the government's regulatory 
activities. We also must realize that these government activities were 
established in response to a surge of rising public expectations about 
corporate performance. Thus, reforming government regulation involves 
striking balances among many laudable objectives and is hardly a search 
for villains. Indeed, the magnitude of the unresolved problems in the 
regulatory area requires efforts by government, business, academic 
researchers, the various interest groups, and the media. Here are some 
of those tasks, at least as I see them: 
1. Role of Government. The basic task of government in the 
regulatory reform area is not to be preoccupied with either technical 
measurements of benefits and costs or administrative procedures, although 
good can be achieved by some sensible changes. But more fundamentally, 
the government leadership -- at federal, state, and local levels -- needs 
to take a dramatically different view of the regulatory mechanism than 
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they now do. Rather than relying on regulation to control in detail 
every facet of private behavior, the regulatory device needs to be seen 
as a very powerful tool to be used reluctantly, and with great care and 
discretion. A good deal of judgment is required in sorting out the hazards 
that it is important to regulate from the kinds of lesser hazards that, 
in Charles J. Schultze's terms, can best be dealt with by ''the normal 
prudence of consumers, workers, and business firms." When the device of 
regulation is relied upon, the emphasis should be placed on identifying 
the least costly and most effective means of achieving social objectives. 
To state what is obvious to an economist but so often ignored in more 
popular discussions, you do not protect the consumer by punishing business. 
2. Role of Business. The basic task of conducting business success-
fully in a regulated environment is extremely difficult. On the one hand, 
business firms need to respond to the rising public expectations for 
producing safe products in a healthy work environment, free of discrinli-
nation. To the extent that businesses increasingly respond voluntarily --
and a great many already do -- the pressures for government intervention 
may subside. Yet, I do not advocate a passive role of automatically 
agreeing to every demand on the part of each interest group, public or 
private. Those demands that do not make sense should be opposed --
lawfully and strongly -- and where appropriate more sensible alternatives 
developed and presented. Rather than vague speechifying on the evils 
of big government or the glories of the free enterprise system, business 
needs to concentrate its efforts on more effectively communicating the 
specific impacts of regulation on its production, sales, employment, and 
prices. 
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3. Role of Interest Groups. A ·little humility might go a long way 
in reducing the shrillness of many of the representatives of the so-called 
Public Interest Groups. It is no simple task to identify the public 
interest in any specific issue of public policy. As a sometime participant 
in government policymaking, it is apparent to me that good policy consists 
of properly balancing and reconciling a variety of bona fide interests. 
This is far more difficult than merely choosing in a simple-minded fashion 
between "public" or "consumer" interests (which are presumably good and 
to be endorsed) and "special" interests, which are presumably evil and 
to be opposed. To quote Allen Ferguson, the head of the Public Interest 
Economics Foundation, "There is an appalling lack of information as to 
the nature of economics and the economy among some of the public interest 
leadership. There is some failure to recognize that economic considerations 
are important in issues of most concern to much of the public in each 
community.'' That i s a model of tactful and diplomatic understatement. 
4. Role of Academic Research. Unfortunate ly, there seems to be a 
parallel between generals fighting the last war and academics researching 
issues of public policy. Whether I speak to business executives, labor 
union representatives, public interest groups, or government officials, 
I find that their key concerns with government regulation of business 
relate to the newer cross-industry type of regulation, typified by EPA, 
OS HA, EEOC, ERISA, and CPSC and their counterparts at state, county, and 
municipal levels. Yet my academic brethren still seem preoccupied with 
railroads, television, and airlines. 
My point is not that the ICC, FCC, or CAB do not deserve professiona l 
attention. Rather, academic literature and teaching need to take fuller 
account of the basic expansion in the scope and character of government 
regulation of business which has been occurring in the past decade. The 
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expansion in regulation -- whether measured by the size of regulatory 
budgets or in numbers of rules -- by and large is in these newer areas. 
The prevailing theories and models of regulation need to be reworked to 
take account of the revised institutional structure. Whether the railroads 
and their unions 11 Capture 11 the Interstate Commerce Commission is a far 
more trivial concern than understanding the full range of impacts of 
environmental, safety, and employment regulation. That improved under ... 
standing is essential for developing support for reducing the many adverse 
side effects of regulation that we have been discussing -- higher costs, 
loss of jobs, reduced productivity and capital formation, and a slower 
rate of innovation of new and better products. 
5. The Role of the Media. Fundamental improvements in the 
regulatory system will not come about until the public demands become 
strong enough to force the subject on to the legislative agendas. This 
will require communicating to the public a far greater understanding of 
the actual operations of the entire gamut of government regulation. 
Stereotypes need to be avoided. Indeed, reality is extremely complex. 
That is, neither business nor labor nor consumer groups are consistently 
on one side of the regulatory reform issue. 
For example, business firms and labor unions in a given regulated 
industry often become strong supporters of the traditional industry-
oriented commission which they have learned to live with, if not to 
dominate. They may join ranks to oppose efforts by consumer groups and 
academics to cut back on the extent of the "protective 11 regulation. 
In contrast, consumer groups advocate expanding the newer types of cross-
industry regulation. They often are joined by labor groups, particularly 
in the occupational health area. Here, reform efforts are led by business 
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groups and academics. These alliances shift from time to time. Specific 
regulations affecting homebuilders may be opposed by unions and companies 
in the construction industry -- although the two groups may differ strongly 
on job safety standards. The older consumer organizations are becoming 
concerned with the ultimate cost to the consumer of government rules. 
The newer consumer groups still emphasize public control over business. 
In contrast to a widely held viewpoint, in my own experience I have 
yet to come across the business executive who enjoys polluting the 
environment or producing unsafe products. What I have found is honest 
disagreement as to the most sensible ways in which to proceed in 
attempting to attain the nation's social objectives. A better under-
standing of the complicated reality surely needs to be communicated to 
the public and to government decision makers. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This is an ambitious agenda for public and private action. But I 
have encountered no 11 quick fixes 11 that v10uld cure all the shortcomings 
of the many efforts to regulate business. Perhaps recognition of that 
fact would set the stage for durable reforms of this aspect of business-
government relations which has such vital impacts on the consumer. 
